Contagious Diseases Are Handicaps Under Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act
I.

INTRODUCTION

After centuries of struggle for equal opportunity, Congress
finally recognized America's handicapped through the enactment
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Rehabilitation Act).' With
this legislation, Congress endeavored to "share with handicapped Americans the opportunities for education, transportation, housing, health care, and jobs that other Americans take for
granted."'2 In an effort to eradicate the powerful prejudice and
ignorance which plagued so many disabled Americans for so
I Pub. L. No. 93-112 § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982) amended by Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-506, & 103(d)(2)(B), 100 Stat. 1807, 1810 (1986) and Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)). The Rehabilitation Act (Act) contains three substantial provisions. Section 501(b) requires most
federal agencies to take affirmative action to employ the handicapped:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality (including the United
States Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission) in the executive branch shall . . . submit to the Office of Personnel Management
and to the [Interagency Committee on Handicapped Employees] an
affirmative action program for the hiring, placement, and advancement of handicapped individuals in such department, agency, or
instrumentality....
29 U.S.C.S. § 791 (b) (Law Co-op Supp. 1985). Section 503(a) requires federal
contractors to take affirmative action to employ the handicapped:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any federal department or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States shall
contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out
such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take
affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified
handicapped individuals as defined in section [7(7) of this Act]. The
provisions of this section shall apply to any subcontract in excess of
$2,500 entered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract
for the procurement of personal services and nonpersonal services
(including construction) for the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 793 (a) (1982). Section 504, which is the primary subject of this Comment, prohibits all organizations receiving federal assistance from discriminating
against handicapped individuals:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
defined in section [7(7) of this Act], shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
2 123 CONG. REC. 13,515 (1977) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
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long,3 Congress equipped the Rehabilitation Act with an expansive definition of "handicapped individual," an anti-discrimination provision, and a favorable enforcement procedure.4 Since
its enactment, the statute has typically been broadly construed by
administrative agencies 5 and narrowly construed by the judiciary.
As Senator Taft remarked:
Too many -handicapped Americans are not served at all, too many lack
jobs, and too many are underemployed-utilized in capacities well below the levels of their training, education, and ability....
[I]f we are to assure that all handicapped persons may participate fully
in the rewards made possible by the vocational rehabilitation program, we must devote more of our energy toward elimination of the
most graceful barrier of all-discrimination.
119 CONG. REC. 24,587 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Taft). See, e.g., Note, The Developing
Law on Equal Employment Opportunityfor the Handicapped. An Overview andAnalysis of the
Major Issues, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 183, 185-186 (1978) (describing the hardship experienced by the handicapped because of lack of employment); Note, Abroad in the
Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J. 1501,
1501-1502 (1973) (discussing the history of discrimination against the handicapped); ten Broek & Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
809, 814-815 (1966) (comparing disabled to "underprivileged ethnic and religious
minority groups").
4 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B). In 1974, Congress amended the statute to provide an
expansive definition of "handicapped individual' for use in § 504 as follows:
[A]ny person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii)
has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such
an impairment.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B). This definition was limited somewhat in 1978 when Congress amended the Act to exclude alcoholics and drug abusers from handicapped
status under the Act if their "current use of alcohol or drugs prevents ... [them]
from performing the duties of the job in question or... [their] employment would
constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others." 124 CONG. REC.
30322 (1978). To enforce the § 504 anti-discrimination provision, the handicapped individual generally need not file a complaint with any federal or state
agency. The individual may go directly to federal district court to seek relief. 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
5 To clarify the statute's vague definitions, the Department of Health and
Human Services (previously known as the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare), under the watchful eye of Congress, promulgated a number of regulations. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634-635 & nn. 14-16
(1984) (discussing Congress' involvement in the Department's promulgation of the
regulations). The regulations define two important terms in the Act's definitions of
a handicapped individual. "Physical impairment" is defined as follows:
[Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory; including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive;
genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1985). In addition, the regulations define "major life activities" as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1985).
3

918

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:916

While the agency regulations provided encouragement to handicapped litigants, the courts left them uncertain as to when the
opportunities" would arise. Amidst the inconsistency and confusion, the United States Supreme Court rendered a startling decision which clarified further the Act's anti-discrimination
provision. Through its step-by-step analysis in School Board of
Nassau County, Florida v. Arline,6 the Supreme Court offered more
insight into the workings of the statute than fourteen years of
case law and regulations had provided. In response to the
Court's decision in Arline, the legislature in April of 1988
amended the Act. 7 While the amendment subjected more programs and activities to the strictures of the Act,8 it decreased to
some degree the number of individuals protected by the
legislation.
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate the Rehabilitation Act, identifying its strengths and weaknesses. In so doing,
the comment will review the recent legislative developments as
well as the judicial interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act. Finally, the Comment will suggest further amendments to the Act
which could increase its social utility.
II.

PRE-ARLINE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF
SECTION 504

The Rehabilitation Act marked the culmination of the disabled's fight for equality. 9 After years as silent Americans, the
handicapped united and demanded the attention of Congress.' °
As a result, Congress enacted legislation which purported to promote rehabilitative services and prevent discrimination." The
key to rehabilitation, according to members of the legislature,
was the handicapped's integration into the workforce.' 2 Yet, sig107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat.
28 (1988).
8 See id.
9 123 CONG. REC. 12,216 (1977) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). Senator
Humphrey heralded the Rehabilitation Act as the "civil rights declaration of the
handicapped." Id. The handicapped legislation marked "[a] historic milestone in
the struggle of disabled people for full equality of opportunity in our nation ......
Id. at 13342 (Sen. Cranston quoting Dr. Frank Bowe, director of the American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities). The Rehabilitation Act was patterned after Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1126 & n.2.
10 See supra note 3.
11 119 CONG. REC. 635 (1973) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
12 See supra note 3. See also S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6388-90.
6
7
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nificant psychological and physical obstacles blocked impaired
Americans' access to employment. Perhaps the most serious barrier faced by America's handicapped was discrimination in the
workplace.' 3 To free impaired Americans from the discriminatory acts of ignorant employers and federal grantees, Congress
enacted section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.14 Section 504 generally prohibits any recipient of federal assistance from discrimi15
nating against "otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals.
Congress provided a definition for the term "handicapped individual" in section 7(6) of the Act.' 6 That provision, as originally
enacted, simply defined a handicapped individual as anyone
whose "physical or mental disability ... constitutes or results in a

substantial handicap to employment." 7 Together these two provisions have been the subject of considerable judicial and administrative interpretation as well as legislative amendment.' 8
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW),
now the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with
the direction and encouragement of Congress, promulgated regulations to clarify the vague and complex terms provided in sections 504 and 7(6).'9 Through its regulations, the Department
attempted to clarify those persons who Congress intended to
protect under section 504.20 Initially, the HEW regulation defin13 119 CONG. REC. 15133 (1973) (statement of Sen. Pell). See also Note, The Developing Law on Equal Employment Opportunity for the Handicapped: An Overview and
Analysis of the Major Issues, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 183 (1978) (description of handicapped's plight and growth as a group). Today, approximately 8.1% of America's
population have some disability which has left them unemployed. United States
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1987, 362 (107th ed).
14 See 119 CONG. REC. 15,133 (1973) (statement of Sen. Pell); id. at 635 (statement of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 3,028 (remarks of Sen. Dole). Senator Dole offered
the statement of a handicapped individual to express his support for the provision:
"Separate but equal. It's still discrimination. Discrimination is a reaction to what
people see-they see a deformed physique and they react. Maybe worse than [to]
seeing a black skin, because they know they're not going to have to be afraid of
turning black". Id.
15 Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 366, 371 (1973).
16 See note 4.
17 See supra note 15.
18 See supra note 5.
19 Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), authorizes the Secretary of
HEW to ensure consistent enforcement of § 504 by directing all the federal agencies to issue its own regulations implementing § 504. See Note, The Developing Law
on Equal Opportunity for the Handicapped.- An Overview and Analysis of the Major Issues, 7
U. BALT. L. REV. 183, 197-99. See also supra note 5 for a recitation of the regulations' provisions.
20 See supra note 5. The regulations defined essential terms in § 706(7)(B)'s defi-
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ing "handicapped individual" mirrored the statutory provisions.
Congress quickly recognized the limitations of a
definition which referred specifically to actual disabilities affecting employment and consequently amended section 7(6) in
1974.22 Section 7(6)'s definition of "handicapped individual"
was significantly expanded to include "any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of
such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."'2 ' By way of the amended definition, Congress invited an
increased number of handicapped Americans to seek shelter
under the Act's protective provisions. 24 The HEW responded to
nition of "handicapped individual" thereby making it easier to determine which
impairments could be considered handicaps within § 504.
21 See 45 C.F.R. § 401.1(i)(1)-(2) (1973). The 1973 regulations defined a "handicapped individual" as follows:
(1) any individual who has a physical or mental disability and a substantial handicap to employment, which is of such a nature that vocational rehabilitation services (paragraph (2)(1) of this section) may
reasonably be expected to render him fit to engage in a gainful occupation, including a gainful occupation which is more consistent with
his capacities and abilities.
(2) any individual who has a physical or mental disability and a substantial handicap to employment for whom vocational rehabilitation
services (paragraph (2)(2) of this section) are necessary for the purpose of extended evaluation to determine rehabilitation potential.
Id.
22 A Senate report stated that:
It was clearly the intent of the Congress in adopting... section 504
(nondiscrimination) that the term "handicapped individual" [that]
section[s] was not to be narrowly limited to employment ....
[A] test of discrimination against a handicapped individual under
section 504 should not be couched either in terms of whether such
individual's disability is a handicap to employment, or whether such
individual can reasonably be expected to benefit, in terms of employment, from vocational rehabilitation services. Such a test is irrelevant
to the many forms of potential discrimination covered by section 504.
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6388.
23 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
24 Expressing the specific intent of the amendment, Congress indicated that the
provisions should be broadly construed. The Senate report provided that:
Clause (A) in the new definition eliminates any reference to employment and makes the definition applicable to the provisions of federally-assisted services and programs. Clause (B) is intended to make
clearer that the coverage of sections 503 and 504 extends to persons
who have recovered-in whole or in part-from a handicapping condition, such as mental or neurological illness, a heart attack, or cancer
and to persons who were classified as handicapped (for example, as
mentally ill or mentally retarded) but who may be discriminated
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the statutory amendment by substantially revising its regulations. 25 Those revised regulations, still in effect today, define the
vague and broad terms supplied by Congress. For purposes of
the Act, the regulations define "physical or mental impairment"
as
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems; neurological; musculoskeletal; special
sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological
disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
26
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
The regulations, by identifying specific functions such as "caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working," make clear the meaning of
"major life activities." 2 7 In the broadest terms, the regulations define the phrase "is regarded as having an impairment" as meaning
that the individual
(A) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by a recipient
as constituting such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as
a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or
(C) has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (j)(2)(i)
28
of this section but is treated as having such an impairment.
The regulations' detailed listing of physical impairments within the
against or otherwise be in need of the protection of section 503 and
504.
Clause (C) in the new definition clarifies the intention to include
those persons who are discriminated against on the basis of handicap,
whether or not they are in fact handicapped, just as title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the ground of race,
whether or not the person discriminated against is in fact a member of
a racial minority. This subsection includes within the protections of
section 503 and 504 those persons who do not in fact have the condition which they are perceived as having, as well as those persons
whose mental or physical condition does not substantially limit their
life activities and who thus are not technically within clause (A) in the
new definition. Members of both of these groups may be subjected to
discrimination on the basis of their being regarded as handicapped.
S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 22, at 38-39, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
6389-90.
25 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (1974).
26 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1987).
27 Id. at § 84.3(j)(2)(ii).
28 Id. at § 84.3(j)(2)(iv).
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coverage of section 504 suggested that the provision reached beyond the traditionally recognized handicaps. 29 Armed with the regulations' more expansive interpretation of a "handicap," impaired
individuals sought judicial determinations of section 504's scope. 3 °

III.

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION

504

PRIOR TO ARLINE

In 1979, six years after the enactment of the Rehabilitation
Act, the United States Supreme Court first considered section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 3 ' In Southeastern Community College
v. Davis,3 a woman with a serious hearing disability was denied
admission to the nursing program at the community college.3 3
The college maintained that because of her hearing disability,
Davis could neither participate safely in the clinical training program nor adequately care for patients.3 4 Davis responded by
bringing an action alleging a violation of section 504 of the Act.3 5
Interpreting the "otherwise qualified" provision of section
504,36 the Court held that an institution may require a handicapped applicant to meet legitimate physical qualifications.3 7
Justice Powell, delivering the opinion of a unanimous Court,
found support for this position in the HHS Regulations. 3 The
regulations mandated that to participate in certain programs and
activities, physical qualifications are essential.3 " The Court found
that nursing required the ability to understand speech without
29 Id. In addition to the agency's contribution to the definition of a "handicapped individual," in 1978, Congress amended the Act to exclude alcoholics and
drug abusers from handicapped status. Congress supported this action because of
the "direct threat to the safety of others" which these individuals posed. 29 U.S.C.
706(7)(B) (1982).
30 See supra note 5.
31 See Southeastern Comm. College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 401. Davis was diagnosed as having a bilateral, sensori-neural hearing
loss. She was unable to understand spoken speech without the use of lipreading.
Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 402. She also alleged she was denied equal protection and due process.
The court dismissed the constitutional claims. Id. at 403 n.3.
36 See supra note 1.
37 Southeastern Comm. College, 442 U.S. at 407.
38 Id. at 405. In defining the term "qualified handicapped individual" under
§ 504, the regulations required that the individual meet all academic and technical
standards. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1978) (emphasis added)).
39 Id. at 407. The explanatory notes to the regulations provide that "technical
standards refers to all nonacademic admissions criteria that are essential to participation in the program in question." Id. at 406 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The notes explain that a blind person possessing all the qualifications for driving
except the ability to see would so qualify. Id. at 407 n.7.
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reliance on lipreading.4" The Court identified numerous situations in which a hearing impaired nurse would be unable to function properly and emphasized the potential harm which could
result.4 ' Accordingly, the Court determined that a hearing impaired individual such as Davis is not "otherwise qualified" for
nursing because she is incapable of meeting the physical qualifications necessary for the competent care of patients.4 2 Thus, the
Court held that the college was not discriminating in violation of
section 504 when it denied Davis admission based on her
handicap. 43
The Court next addressed Davis' claim that section 504 required affirmative conduct on the part of Southeastern to accommodate her.4 4 Turning once again to the HHS regulations, the
Court recognized that in some circumstances, institutions subject
to the strictures of section 504 must make modifications to their
programs.4 5 The required modifications, however, are limited by
the regulations which specifically exclude the provision of "personal services." 4 6 The Court contemplated the adjustments
which Southeastern would have to make to ensure Davis' safe
participation in the program 4 7 and held that section 504 imposed
no obligation upon recipients of federal funds to make the substantial modifications necessary to accommodate a handicapped
individual such as Davis.4
The Southeastern decision restricted the amount of protection
Id. at 407.
Id. at 403. The Court reiterated the district court's findings, citing situations
in which a hearing impaired individual could not properly function. The Court
noted that a nurse is frequently in an operating room or intensive care unit where
masks are worn by all medical staff. The individual who is dependent on lipreading
for communication could become a danger to the patients in such a situation because of his/her inability to understand a doctor's orders. Id.
42 Id. at 407.
43 Id. at 414.
44 Id. at 404.
45 Id. at 408-09. The Court took note of regulation provisions applicable to
post-secondary education programs which required § 504-covered institutions to
make modifications in their programs to accommodate handicapped individuals.
The regulation suggested time extensions for completion of degrees, substitution
of course, and changes in the manner of class instruction. Id. at 408-09 & n.9 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (1978)).
46 Id. at 409.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 411. The Court seems to suggest that there must be a balance between
the statutory rights of the handicapped to be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of grantees in preserving the integrity of their programs. Id. at 41240
41
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section 504 afforded handicapped individuals. 4 ' Additionally,
Southeastern established that an institution has virtually no affirmative duty under section 504 to substantially modify its program in
order to accommodate the handicapped.50 Consequently, to obtain protection from discrimination under section 504, a handicapped individual must meet all of a program's requirements,
including any physical qualifications. 5 ' A handicapped individual, thus, could legally be barred from certain programs or activities if he was incapable of performing some of the program's
physical tasks.52
For several years after Southeastern, the Supreme Court failed
to adjudicate a section 504 case causing some legal scholars to
speculate as to whether the statute had been drained of its
strength.53 In 1984, however, new life was breathed into section
504 by the Supreme Court's decision in ConsolidatedRail Corporation v. Darrone. 4 The ConsolidatedRail decision marked the first
time that the Court applied section 504 in an employment context.55 In ConsolidatedRail, a locomotive engineer who had been
injured while employed by Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) brought suit alleging his section 504 rights had been violated.56 Darrone's claim was based on the fact that after the
accident Conrail refused
to employ him, although he was still ca57
pable of working.
49 See generally, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: RehabilitatingSection 504 after
Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171 (1980). The Southeastern decision advocated a
more stringent application process for handicapped individuals. As the author suggests, handicapped individuals must go through a two-step analysis of their qualifications. First, they must meet the same admissions criteria as nonhandicapped
individuals. Then, they must meet the school's determination that it can reasonably accommodate them. Id. at 188.
50 Southeastern Comm. College, 442 U.S. at 411.
51 Id. at 406.
52 See id.

53 See supra note 49.
54 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
55 Id. at 631-32. Although Congress clearly indicated that § 504 applied to employment discrimination, no cases involving employment and § 504 were brought
to the Supreme Court. Most cases died in the appellate courts because the agency
did not receive financial assistance for employment purposes. Id. at 629 n.6, 632
n.12. See also Note, Handicap Discrimination in Employment: The Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 39 ARK. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1985) (discussing the non-existence of § 504 application in employment situations before Consolidated).
56 ConsolidatedRail, 465 U.S. at 628. Darrone worked for Erie Lackawanna Railroad which Consolidated acquired pursuant to Subchapter III of the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act of 1973. Id. at 627.
57 Id. at 628. Darrone was injured while working for the railroad. Due to the
accident, his left hand and forearm had to be amputated. Id.
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The Consolidated Rail Court held that section 504's bar on
employment discrimination was not limited to programs that received federal financial assistance primarily to promote employment. 58 Rejecting the trend of the circuit courts which had
consistently held that section 504's nondiscrimination requirement was only applicable to employment situations where employment was a primary objective of the federal assistance, 59 the
Court found in favor of Darrone despite the fact that Conrail had
received assistance for reorganization purposes only.6 In reaching that decision, the Court invalidated the commonly held view
that the 1978 amendments to the Act incorporated Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act and thereby restricted the purview of the antidiscrimination provision. 6 ' Examining the legislative history of
section 504, the Court found no trace of an intent to make Title
VI's "primary objective" limitation applicable to section 504.62
Instead, the Court discovered broad language condemning discrimination against the handicapped for "any program or activity
receiving [f]ederal financial assistance." 6 The amendments had
been intended to mirror only the remedial provisions of Title VI
58 Id. at 625. The Court rejected the district court's holding that § 504's applicability was limited by the Title VI "primary objective" requirement. Id.
59 See, e.g., Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 976 (1982); United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908 (2d
Cir. 1981); Carmi v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer District, 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, 590 F.2d 87
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979). This view was based on the idea
that by patterning § 505 after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress
intended to incorporate Title VI in its entirety into the Rehabilitation Act. Section
604 of Title VI limits the applicability of Title VI to "employment practice[s] ...
where a primary objective of the Federal assistance is to provide employment."
ConsolidatedRail, 465 U.S. at 631. The appellate courts appeared to view this limitation as incorporated into § 504, making the antidiscrimination provision applicable
only to programs or activities receiving federal assistance with employment as the
primary objective. Id. at 630 n.6.
60 ConsolidatedRail, 465 U.S. at 627.
61 Id. at 632.

62 Id. The Court found that Congress intended only to use § 604 of Title VI as a
model for § 505 in terms of providing suggested remedies for a § 504 violation. Id.
63 Id. at 632-35 (emphasis in original). The Court first turned to § 504 itself for
support, quoting the language which identified to whom the prohibition applied.
The Court then referred to statements made by Senators Cranston, Taft, and Williams concerning the "profound effect" employment discrimination could have on
the provision of rehabilitative services. The Court further remarked that other sections of the Act involving employment discrimination require all federal agencies
and employers to act affirmatively to eliminate discrimination. Id. at 635 n.12. In
addition, the Court took notice of the fact that the Act's amendments were actually
the codification of the HEW's regulations, which applied to all programs obtaining
federal assistance for any purpose. Id. at 635.
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and to codify the HHS regulations.6 4 The HHS, the Court emphasized, had consistently interpreted section 504 to apply to all
recipients of federal financial aid.6 5 Discerning no limiting language in either the legislative history or executive interpretations
of section 504, the Court concluded that the provision prohibited
employment discrimination on the basis of handicap by any program, activity or employer receiving federal assistance for any
purpose.6 6
The ConsolidatedRail decision restored some of section 504's
strength 6 7 and removed the restriction which had been placed on
section 504 by the lower courts. 6 8 It became evident that section
504 governed the conduct of more employers than had previously been acknowledged.6 9 More handicapped Americans came
forward to defend their right to be free from discrimination in
the workplace.7 ° Consolidated Rail had named section 504 as the
weapon for fighting employment discrimination. 7' Not surprisingly, it was not long before the Supreme Court was again confronted with a section 504 employment discrimination claim.7 2
One year after the Consolidated Rail decision, the Court in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon adjudicated a section 504 employment discrimination case in which the State of California was
the accused employer.73 In Atascadero, the plaintiff was a graduate
student who suffered from diabetes mellitus and blindness in one
eye. 74 The student had applied to the state hospital for a position as an assistant recreational therapist but was denied employment.7 5 Alleging discriminatory treatment on the basis of
handicap, he initiated an action against the state under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 7 6 The defendant state of CaliforId.
Id. at 634 nn. 14-15. Justice Powell also placed great weight on the HEW
regulations in the Southeastern opinion. Here, he again used the regulations as a
tool for interpreting the scope of § 504. Id. See supra note 45 and accompanying
text.
66 Consolidated Rail, 465 U.S. at 625.
64
65

67 See id.

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See Consolidated Rail, 465 U.S. at 624.
See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
71 See Consolidated Rail, 465 U.S. at 625.
72 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 234.
73 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
74 Id. at 236.
75 Id.
76 Id.
68
69
70
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nia raised the eleventh amendment as a defense and the issue
reached the United States Supreme Court."
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 78 recognized the importance and utility of the amendment and thereafter identified
certain limited situations in which the state would not be protected from suit. 79 The Court reasoned that Congress may abro-

gate the states' constitutional immunity from suit "only by
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute."8' 0 The Court then looked to the Rehabilitation Act to
determine if Congress had met this stringent test."' Examining
only the wording of the relevant provisions, the Court found the
general language of the statute insufficient to override the
amendment's grant of immunity. 2 Moreover, the Court refused
to recognize the states' acceptance of funds as consent to suits
under the Act.8 3 The Atascadero Court thus concluded that
although a state receives significant financial assistance under the
Act, it will not be subject to punishment for violation of the Act's
provisions.84

In a lengthy dissent, Justice Brennan joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens criticized the majority for "exempting the States from compliance with laws that bind every other
legal actor in our Nation." 8 5 Justice Brennan maintained that the
majority had placed unreasonable demands on Congress by requiring it to provide specific language in the statute in order to
abrogate the states' immunity.8 6 He suggested that the proper
approach was to examine the legislative history of the Act to de77 Id. at 236-37. The eleventh amendment provides: "TheJudicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Through its grant of sovereign
immunity, the amendment limits judicial authority. Id.
78 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 235. JoiningJustice Powell for the majority were Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
79 Id. at 237-40. The Court listed certain exceptions to the reach of the eleventh
amendment, such as (1) if a State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal
court through express language or "overwhelming implication from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction" or (2) if Congress acts
pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity through unequivocal language in the statute. Id.
80 Id. at 242.
81 Id. at 244-46.

The Court examined the language of §§ 504 and 505. Id.
at 246-47.
id.
85 Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 254 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See
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termine Congress' intent regarding the states.8 7 Citing the statements of numerous senators, Justice Brennan provided evidence
of a Congressional intent to include the states within the strictures of section 504.88 Additionally, Justice Brennan criticized
the majority's reliance on the constitutional significance of the
eleventh amendment.8 9 Engaging in an extensive review of recent research, Justice Brennan characterized eleventh amendment doctrine as being "anachronistic" and based on a mistaken
historical premise.9 0 In conclusion, Justice Brennan stressed that
the majority rule obstructed the will of Congress and insulated
the states from the consequences of their illegal conduct. 9 '
Atascadero represented a significant defeat for the handicapped. 2 The Court preserved an "anachronistic"9 " constitu94
tional doctrine at the expense of millions of Americans' rights.
Section 504 had been rendered powerless against the states and
their eleventh amendment immunity. 95 Within a year, the Court
had taken away much of what it had conferred upon the handi87 Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, in the earlier § 504 cases,
had consistently turned to the legislative history and administrative interpretations.
This was the first time he overlooked the history. See Consolidated Rail v. Darrone,
465 U.S. 624 (1984); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979).
88 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 248-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Justice Brennan
quoted Senator Cranston with respect to liability under § 504:
[W]ith respect to State and local bodies or local officials, attorney's
fees, similar to cost, would be collected from the official, in his official
capacity from funds of his or her agency or under his or her control;
or from the State or local government-regardless of whether such
agency of government is a named party.
Id. at 252 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing 124 CONG. REC. 30,347 (1978)). He also
pointed to a statement made by Representative Jeffords, in describing another section of the Act, that the section "applies 504 to the Federal Government as well as
State and local recipients of Federal dollars." Id. at 251 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing 124 CONG. REC. 13,901 (1978)). Representative Jeffords further stated, "It
did not seem right to me that the Federal Government should require States and
localities to eliminate discrimination against the handicapped wherever it exists and
remain exempt themselves." Id. at 251 n.4. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 124
CONG. REC. 38,551 (1978)). In addition, Justice Brennan emphasized the words of
Representative Vanik that "[O]ur Governments tax [handicapped] people, their
parents and relatives, but fail to provide services for them .... The opportunities
provided by the Government almost always exclude the handicapped." Id. at 249
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 117 CONG. REC. 45,974 (1971)).
89 See id. at 258-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 258-59, 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 258 & n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92 See id.
93 See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
94 See id. See supra note 29.
95 See id.
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capped in Consolidated Rail.96 This was not the only blow the
Court had dealt to section 504 in 1985. 91 Several months before
the Atascadero decision, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate
expressed an unwillingness
to extend section 504 to a different
98
type of discrimination.

In Alexander, a group of Tennessee Medicaid 99 recipients
brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the
state's proposed benefit reduction plan. 00 The group contended
that the planned reduction of paid inpatient hospital days would
have a disproportionate impact on the handicapped recipients.' 0 '
Asserting that any global limitation of the number of paid inpatient days would be discriminatory, given the special needs of the
handicapped,1 0 2 the group argued that such disparate impact
dis03
crimination was a violation of section 504 of the Act.1
Reverting back to its practice of studying legislative and administrative directives, 10 4 the Court recognized that some claims
of disparate-impact discrimination could be redressed under section 504.105 Nevertheless, the Court held that the effect of the
Tennessee Medicaid reduction plan was not an actionable disparate-impact claim.106 The Court reasoned that the antidis-

96

See Consolidated Rail, 465 U.S. at 624.

97 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).

98 See id.
99 Id. at 287. The Court defines Medicaid as:
[A] joint state-federal funding program for medical assistance in
which the Federal Government approves a state plan for the funding
of medical services for the needy and then subsidizes a significant portion of the financial obligations the State has agreed to assume.
Id. at 287 n.1. The Court furthered indicated that "[o]nce a State voluntarily
chooses to participate in Medicaid, the State must comply with the requirements of
Title XIX and applicable regulations. Id. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301
(1980)).
100 Id. at 289. The plaintiffs were not seeking compensatory damages. Therefore
the eleventh amendment issue would be decided in Atascadero.
101 Id. at 290. The plan called for a reduction from 20 to 14 paid annual inpatient
hospital days. The plan was offered as a cost-saving measure. Id. at 289.
102 Id. at 290. The plaintiffs offered statistical evidence in support of their position. Id.
103 Id.
104 See Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 397; Consolidated Rail, 465 U.S. at 624. The Court
in Southeastern and ConsolidatedRail relied heavily on legislative and administrative
materials. The Court later abandoned this practice in Atascadero, focusing more on
the overriding importance of protecting the eleventh amendment.
105 Alexander, 469 U.S. at 297-98. The Court hinted that such claims in the areas
of employment, education, and elimination of physical barriers to access might be
more successful. The Court referred to various statements made by Senators which
refer to these areas. Id. at 307.
106 Id. at 287.
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crimination provision required that handicapped individuals be
given equal, meaningful access to the provided benefit. 10 7 The
Act did not guarantee the handicapped equal results from the benefit.'0 8 The Court found that since all of Tennessee's Medicaid
recipients received identical benefits, section 504's mandate had
been satisfied. 109 Additionally, the Court rejected the group's
proposal that the state eliminate the durational limitations altogether." 0 Citing Southeastern,"' the Court pointed out that the
administrative cost of modifying the plan would exceed the accommodations required by section 504.'12 While the Alexander
Court found the potential administrative burden on the state to
be more compelling than the handicapped's need for medical
treatment, 1 1 the decision provided some assurance that section
504 would be instrumental in battling future disparate impacts
on the handicapped. 1 4 This avenue remained unexplored as the
disheartened handicapped wondered exactly who or what section
504 protected."15

Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of the Alexander decision was not the denial of extra Medicaid benefits to the handicapped 1 6 but rather the refusal of the Court to set workable
guidelines to aid handicapped litigants." 7 Alexander was not the
first defeat the handicapped had faced, nor was it the first time
that the Court had declined an opportunity to define the boundaries of section 504. 18 After more than a decade in existence, section 504 remained a vain attempt by Congress to provide
handicap reform." 9 It was against this background that the
Supreme Court decided School Board of Nassau County, Florida v.
107

Id. at 301.

108 Id. at 304.

109 Id. at 302-303.
110 Id. at 306.
M Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 397.
112 Alexander, 469 U.S. at 308.
113 See id.
114 Id. at 297-98. The Court appeared to reject this claim because the states have
traditionally been given broad discretion concerning Medicaid. See id. at 303. See
also Rebell, Structural Discriminationand the Rights of the Disabled 74 GEO. L.J. 1435
(1986).
115 See Rebell, supra note 114, at 1435.
116 See id.
117 See id. at 1447.
118 See Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 397.
119 See id. See also Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (1985);
Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367 (1984); Tudyman v. United
Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (D.C. Cal. 1984).
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Arline. 120
IV.

THE ARLINE DECISION

In 1957, Gene Arline contracted infectious tuberculosis and
was hospitalized for treatment. 12' For the following twenty years,
Arline's disease remained in remission. 12 2 During this time, Arline acquired a position as an elementary school teacher in Nas124
sau County, Florida.' 23 She was a highly regarded employee 125
and continued to teach in Nassau County for thirteen years.
Arline's term of employment was interrupted on three occasions
when she suffered relapses of tuberculosis.' 2 6 Each time, the
School Board suspended Arline with pay for the remainder of the
school year.' 2 7 After the 1978-1979 school year had ended, however, the School Board decided to make Arline's suspension permanent.' 28 The Board did not cite either misconduct or inability
as the reason for her dismissal.' 29 Instead, the Board named Arline's "continued recurrence of tuberculosis" as cause for em30
ployment termination.
Arline sought to have the School Board's decision reversed
through state administrative proceedings.' 3 ' After she was de120 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
121 Id. at 1125. Tuberculosis is defined as "[a] specific disease ... [w]hich may
affect almost any tissue or organ of the body, the most common seat of the disease
being the lungs . . . The local symptoms vary according to the part affected, the
general symptoms vary according to the part affected, the general symptoms are
those of... hectic fever, sweats, and emaciation." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY

1498 (5th ed. 1982).
122 Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1125.
123 Id. Arline began working for the Nassau County, Florida school department
in 1966. Id.
124 Brief for Petitioner at 8, School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 107 S.
Ct. 1123 (1987) (No. 86-1277). Arline was a tenured teacher with the Nassau
County School Department. Id.
125 Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1125. Arline worked for Nassau County from 1966 to
1979. Id.
126 Id. Tuberculosis was discovered in Arline's system in 1977. This was the first
of three relapses to occur within a year. She had a second relapse in the Spring of
1978 and her third in November of 1978. Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. The School Board held a hearing at which it decided to terminate her
employment. Id.
129 See id.
130 Id. The School Board did not dispute that Arline was dismissed solely on the
basis of her illness. Instead, it reasoned that their action was justified because Arline posed a health risk to her students. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 124, at 15.
131 School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 772 F.2d 759, 760 (11th Cir.
1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987). Arline had a hearing before the State Board of
Education. She was denied relief. Pursuant to a state law concerning administra-
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nied relief, she initiated an action in federal court, alleging a violation of section 504.132 Arline contended that her susceptibility
to tuberculosis made her a "handicapped individual" within the
meaning of the Act and that by dismissing her solely because of
her illness, the School Board violated section 504.113 The School
Board contended, however, that Arline's dismissal was justified
because of the substantial health risk she posed to the school
children. 1 34 The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida accepted this rationale and denied Arline's request for relief. 1 35 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court's decision, finding that
contagious diseases are handicaps within the coverage of section
504.136 Specifically, the court held that Arline's condition fell
"neatly within the statutory and regulatory framework" of the
Act. "37
' The United States Supreme Court granted the School
138
and subsequently affirmed the
Board's petition for certiorari
39
appellate court's decision.1

The Court began its analysis as it had in prior decisions by
tive practices, Arline appealed to the First District Court of Appeals in Florida,
which also ruled against her. 772 F.2d at 760 n.3.
132 Id. at 760. Arline also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
she was denied due process under the fourteenth amendment. Both of the lower
courts rejected this claim. Arline did not present the issue to the Supreme Court.
Id. at 760 n.3.
133 Id. at 761. Arline first argued that her handicap "created no barrier at all to
her continued employment because the risk that she would infect her students was
so minimal." Id. Alternatively, she claimed that "if nonsusceptibility to tuberculosis was a necessary physical qualification for teaching small children, the school
district should have offered her 'reasonable accommodation.' " Id. Arline suggested that she could have taught older, less susceptible children or that she could
have done an administrative job. Id.
134 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 124, at 14-15. At trial, a physician specializing
in tuberculosis testified concerning Arline's condition and the infectious nature of
the disease. Dr. Marianne McEuen, M.D. described tuberculosis as "an infectious
disease which is capable of being transmitted from one individual to another by
means of breathing, coughing, sneezing, or other respiratory activity." Id. at 8.
Children, she emphasized, are particularly susceptible to the disease. Id.
135 Arline, 772 F.2d at 761. Inferring legislative intent, the court held first that a
contagious disease such as tuberculosis was not a handicap within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act. It then went on to conclude that even if an individual with a
contagious disease could be considered handicapped, Arline was not "otherwise
qualified" to teach elementary school because of the potential danger to the children. In addition, the court found that the Nassau County School Department did
not meet the federal funding test of § 504 and therefore could not be bound by it.
Id. at 761-62.
136 Id. at 764.
137 Id.
138 School Bd. of Nassau Cty, Fla. v. Arline, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986).
139 Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1126.
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examining the legislative and administrative history of section
504. 40 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan emphasized the
legislature's effort to protect impaired Americans from the ignorance and archaic attitudes of society.' 4 ' The Justice pointed
with approval to the 1974 amendments to the Act which included
individuals erroneously labelled "handicapped" within section
504's coverage.' 42 In addition, the Court recognized the insight
that the HHS regulations provided to the meaning of "handicapped individual" under section 504.143 Relying on this legislative and administrative
history, the Court considered the merits
44
of Arline's claim.1
The Court first addressed the issue of whether Arline was a
handicapped individual within the meaning of the statute. 45 Arline's tuberculosis affected her respiratory system and caused her
to be hospitalized.' 46 Scrutinizing the definitions supplied by the
regulations, the Court found that Arline had a "physical impairment" which substantially limited one or more of her "major life
activities." 147 The Court reasoned that Arline's hospitalization
for the disease demonstrated that she had a "record of ... impairment" for purposes of the statute. 48 Conceding that Arline
had such record, the School Board contended, however, that it
was irrelevant since Arline was not discharged due to her physical
incapabilities, but rather because she posed a health risk to
others. 4 9 Accordingly, the School Board argued that Arline was
not a handicapped individual within the purview of the statute.
The Court dismissed the School Board's contention with little effort.' 5 ° Referring once again to the 1974 amendments to
the Act, the Court maintained that the Legislature never intended to permit an employer to "seize upon the distinction" between "the contagious effects of a disease" and the "disease's
physical effects on a [patient].' 15 ' By extending coverage to indi140 Id. at 1126-27. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 287; Consolidated Rail, 465 U.S. at
624; Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 397.
141 Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1126.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1127.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1128.
150 See id. at 1128-29.
151 Id. at 1128.
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viduals "regarded as having" a physical impairment, the Court
declared that Congress was concerned that society's fears concerning disease and disability would create a handicapping condition. 152 Noting the discriminatory treatment historically given to
those who were perceived as contagious, 153 the Court emphasized that the Rehabilitation Act was designed to replace irrational, reflexive reactions to handicaps with actions based on
informed medically-sound judgments.154 From this interpretation of legislative intent, the Court concluded that excluding all
individuals with actual or perceived contagious diseases from section 504's coverage would result in "discrimination on the basis
of mythology."' 5 5 Instead, the Court suggested that these individuals should be evaluated in light of medical evidence. 156 Accordingly, the Court concluded that an individual suffering from
a contagious disease can be a handicapped person within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Before section 504 relief may
be granted, however, the individual must be otherwise qualified
for the position.' 5 7
In order to determine whether Arline was otherwise qualified for the job of elementary school teacher, the Court remanded the case and directed the lower court to conduct an
"individualized inquiry" in order to make appropriate factual
findings.' 58 The Court explained that such an inquiry was necessary to achieve the goal of section 504.-protecting the handicapped from deprivations based on ignorance and prejudice
while respecting the interests of grantees in preventing the infection of others. 59 To aid the lower court in conducting this inquiry, the Court enunciated a three-pronged method for
determining if an individual is otherwise qualified. 6 ° First, the
152

Id. at 1129.

153 Id. at 1129 & nn.12-13.
154 Id. at 1129.
155 Id. at 1130.
156

Id.

157 Id. at 1131.
158

Id.

159 Id. at 1131 & n.16. The Court explicitly stated that:

A person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious
disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for
his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that
risk. The Act would not require a school board to place a teacher with
active, contagious tuberculosis in a classroom with elementary school
children.
Id.
160 Id. at 1131.

1989]

COMMENT

935

court should establish the nature and extent of the risk associated
with the disease. 16 1 Second, in making these findings of fact, the
court should "defer to the medical judgments of public health
officials.' 162 As a final step, the court must consider whether the
the
accommodate
could
reasonably
employer/grantee
63
individual.1

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented
from the majority opinion." 6 According to the dissent, the majority ignored precedent by extending the Rehabilitation Act's
protection to contagious diseases. 165 Chief Justice Rehnquist
posited that the language of the Act was ambiguous and therefore did not provide notice to grantees that such a condition
would be placed on receipt of federal funds. 166 In support of his
position, the ChiefJustice cited case law concerning placement of
conditions on federal funds as well as federal and state legislation
pertaining to contagious diseases. 167 The dissent advocated a
strict adherence to the provisions of the statute without reference
to legislative intent.' 68 The Chief Justice concluded that because
neither the Act nor the regulations explicitly mentioned contagiousness, it could not be considered a handicap within section
504.169 The dissent further criticized the majority's interpretation of legislative intent. 7 ° Referring to the 1978 amendments
to the Act, 171 the Chief Justice construed the exclusion of drug
abusers and alcoholics as manifesting an intent to keep the Rehabilitation Act from interfering with public health and safety con161 Id. The Court adopted a proposal submitted by the American Medical Association as amicus, which suggested that the inquiry should include:
[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the
state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the
disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the
carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential
harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be
transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.
Id. (citations omitted).
162 Id. at 1130 & n.15.
163 Id. at 1131. The Court cited Southeastern and its standards for what constitutes
"reasonable accommodation." Id. at 1131 n.17. The Court also states that
"[e]mployers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation
for a handicapped employee." Id. at 1131 n.19.
164 See id. at 1132 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1132-33 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 1132 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
168 See id. at 1133 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.

at 1133-34 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See supra note 4.
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cerns. 7 2 According to the dissent, the majority's decision
directly contradicted this legislative intent.'13 In a final comment, Chief Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of extending
17 4
section 504 beyond manageable bounds.

In light of the Supreme Court's prior decisions, Arline could
be considered a tremendous victory for the handicapped. 75 Following legislative intent, the Court broadly construed section
504 to include contagious individuals as handicapped.' 76 Arline,
therefore, cleared the way for section 504 litigation by those discriminated against on the basis of contagion. 17 7 Moreover, the
Arline Court furnished handicapped litigants with guidelines for
the ambiguous antidiscrimination provision. 78 Through its stepby-step analysis of the Arline case, the Court developed a method
1 79
for resolving section 504 cases.
V.

POST-ARL1NE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

While the Supreme Court was fervently developing its version of "legislative intent," the drafters of the Rehabilitation Act
80
were desperately attempting to "restore" the law's vitality.1
The Act's original sponsors noted the Supreme Court's misconstruction of the anti-discrimination legislation at an early date
and expressed concern that the early decisions marked a "shameful back-sliding on civil rights."'' In 1984, the civil rights advo172 Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1134 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 1134 n.5 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 1134 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
175 Compare Arline, 107 S.Ct. at 1123 with Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 234 (exempting
states from punishment for § 504 violations); Alexander, 469 U.S. at 287 (denying
handicapped relief under § 504 for disparate-impact discrimination because of the
administrative burden which a change of the plan would cause); Southeastern, 442
U.S. at 397 (limiting § 504 by allowing physical qualifications of an impaired individual to be considered and by minimizing the amount of accommodation required
of grantees for handicapped individuals).
176 See Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1127-32.
177 See

id.

178 See id.
179 See id.
180 In 1984, the Committee on Labor and Human Resources recognized that the
Supreme Court had not properly construed section 504 of the Act. The Court's
decisions in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) and Consolidated Rail
v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) sparked new Congressional interest in the civil
rights laws. From 1984 to 1987, the drafters of the original Rehabilitation Act
struggled to obtain majority approval of the Civil Rights Restoration Act. See Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the U.S. Senate, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1987) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
181 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 180, at 2.
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cates in Congress introduced legislation intended to restore "the
broad civil rights protections" originally granted through section
83
504 of the Act. I8 2 The 1984 bill was rejected by Congress.

Throughout the three years that followed, the original drafters of
the Act struggled, without success, to shepherd the civil rights
legislation through the Congress. 8 4 The enactment of the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987185 (the Restoration Act) signified
a long overdue victory for the drafters and millions of oppressed
handicapped Americans.
Although the Restoration Act did not actually broaden the
substantive civil rights provisions, 8 6 it supplied the handicapped
with additional protection from discrimination by restoring the
Act to its "pre-judicial interpretation" status. Specifically, the
Restoration Act clarified two essential provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, legislatively overruling the Atascaderois 7 decision, expanding the Supreme Court's holding in Consolidated Rail,'"8 and
codifying its decision in Arline.' s 9 The Restoration Act amended
section 504 by clearly defining the programs and activities governed by the Act.1 90 The amendment provides that a program or
activity will include all of the operations of:
(1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or

(B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency (and
each other State or local government entity) to which the
assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a state or

local government;
(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution,
or a public system of higher education; or
(B) a local educational agency..., system of vocational education, or other school system;
See id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Simon).
Id. at 1-3. Prior bills proposing amendments to the Act were effectively "held
hostage by a campaign of obfuscation and misinformation." Id. at 6. Some members of the Congress entangled the proposed amendments in a mass of confusion
by suggesting that the legislation involved issues such as abortion, religion, and
restraints on business. Id. at 6-7.
182
183

184

Id.

Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 31
(1988).
186 Civil Rights Hearings,supra note 180, at 3.
187 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
188 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
189 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
190 Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 4.
185
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(3)(A) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole;
or
(ii) which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care, housing, social services, or parks
and recreation; or
(B) the entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to which Federal financial assistance is extended,
in the case of any other corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship; or
(4) any other entity which is established by two or more of the
entities described in paragraph (1), (2) or (3); any part of
which is extended Federal financial assistance. 19 1
The Restoration Act effectively overrules the Atascadero112 decision
by explicitly naming the states as covered programs, thus abrogating
their eleventh amendment immunity in "unmistakably clear ...language." ' " The Consolidated Rail'" holding is clarified and expanded by the Restoration Act's inclusion of all entities receiving
95
any federal financial assistance within section 504's coverage.'
Congress recognized the hardship which could potentially be placed
on small programs receiving federal assistance and provided an exception to this all-encompassing provision. 19 6 According to the
amendment, "small providers are not required.., to make significant structural alterations to their existing facilities for the purpose
of assuring program accessibility, if alternative means of providing
the services are available."' 9 7 Finally, Congress addressed the issues raised in Arline' 98 and amended section 7(6) of the Rehabilitation Act.' 9 9 Clarifying the definition of "handicapped individual"
for purposes of employment, section nine states that the term "does
not include an individual who has a currently contagious disease or
infection and who, by reason of such diseases or infection, would
constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals
or who, by reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is
191 Id.
192

473 U.S. 234 (1985).

193 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
194 465 U.S. 624 (1984).

195 See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text. See also Pub. L. No. 100-259,

§ 4.
196

Id. at § 4(2)(C).

197 Id.

198 Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1123.
199 Pub. L. No. 100-259 § 9.
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unable to perform the duties of the job." 2" The amendment codifies the Arline decision by recognizing contagious individuals as
handicapped.2 0' Additionally, the amendment places a limitation
on "otherwise qualified" findings by excluding dangerously contagious individuals from the definition of handicapped individual.2 "2
At long last, the Restoration Act actually seemed to rehabilitate the
judicially disabled anti-discrimination provision.
Since the illuminating Arline opinion and the enactment of the
Restoration Act in early 1988, a number of section 504 cases have
been decided. These decisions indicate that despite its renewed
promise of protection, the new and improved section 504 may still
be the victim of judicial battering. Shortly after the enactment of
the Restoration Act, the Supreme Court decided Traynor v.
20 3
Turnage.
The plaintiffs in Traynor were honorably discharged veterans
who, because of their alcoholism, did not exhaust their educational
benefits under the G.I. Bill.204 They requested an extension generally available to veterans who were prevented from using their benefits due to "a physical or mental disability which was not the result
of... [their] own willful misconduct. ' ' 20 5 The Veterans' Administration (VA) interpreted the term "willful misconduct" in a regulation to include alcoholism which is not the result of an underlying
psychiatric disorder, identified as "primary alcoholism.- 20 6 Pursuant to this regulation, the VA denied plaintiffs their requested extensions. 2 07 Alleging violations of constitutionally protected rights and
Id.
See supra notes 145-157 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158-165 and accompanying text.
108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988).
Id. at 1376.
205 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 95-202, Tit. II, § 203 (a)(l), 91 Stat. 1429, 38 U.S.C.
§ 1662(a)(7)). Veterans generally have ten years in which to take advantage of the
benefits. Id.
206 Id. (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(2) (1987)). The regulation provides:
Alcoholism: The simple drinking of alcoholic beverage is not of itself
willful misconduct. The deliberate drinking of a known poisonous
substance or under conditions which would raise a presumption to
that effect will be considered willful misconduct. If, in the drinking of
a beverage to enjoy its intoxicating effects, intoxication results proximately [sic] and immediately in disability or death, the disability or
death will be considered the result of the person's willful misconduct.
Organic diseases and disabilities which are a secondary result of the
chronic use of alcohol as a beverage, whether out of compulsion or
otherwise, will not be considered of willful misconduct origin.
Id.
207 Traynor, 108 S. Ct. at 1376.
200
201
202
203
204
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the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiffs brought separate actions in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
and the District Court for the District of Columbia.20 Both district
courts applied the Rehabilitation Act and held in favor of the plaintiffs.2 " 9 On appeal, the respective courts of appeals rendered conflicting opinions.2 1 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 1 1
As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court established that VA
decisions which are challenged under the Rehabilitation Act are
subject to judicial review.2 1 2 The Court then considered the discrimination claim. 213 Referring to the legislative history of the VA's
benefit extension provision, the Court concluded that if Congress
had intended to exclude primary alcoholism from the willful mis'
conduct classification, it "most certainly would have said so. 214
The Court pointed out that Congress did not repeal, amend, or criticize the VA's willful misconduct provision in any of its amendments
to the Rehabilitation Act.21 5 Moreover, the Court opined that the
regulation's preclusion of primary alcoholics from using the exten208 Id. at 1377. Traynor brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. See Traynor v. Waiters, 606 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). McKelvey brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. See
McKelvey v. Walters, 596 F. Supp. 1317 (D.D.C. 1984).
209 Id. In Traynor, the district court rejected the constitutional claims based on
due process and equal protection. The court adopted the plaintiff's Rehabilitation
Act argument and held that alcoholism is a handicap under the Act. The court then
found that the VA had discriminated against Traynor in violation of the Act. In
McKelvey, the district court invalidated 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(C)(2) (1987) as contrary
to the Rehabilitation Act and directed the VA to determine whether McKelvey was
disabled without referring to the regulation. Traynor, 108 S. Ct. at 1377.
210 Id. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Traynor reversed the lower
court, finding that judicial review of the Rehabilitation Act claim was barred by 38
U.S.C. § 211(a). The statutory provision bars judicial review of "the decisions of
the Administration on any question of law or fact under any law administered by
the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans." Traynor, 108 S. Ct.
at 1377 (citing Traynor v. Walters, 606 F. Supp. 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in McKelvey determined that
judicial review was not barred by section 211 (a) but reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the regulation was consistent with the Act. Traynor, 108 S.Ct. at
1377-78 (citing McKelvey v. Turnage, 792 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
211 Traynor, 108 S. Ct. at 1378.
212 Id. at 1378-80. The Court noted "the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action." Id. at 1378 (quoting Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)). The Court then
examined the legislative history of § 211 (a) to determine congressional intent. Id.
at 1379. The Court concluded that claims challenging VA decisions based on the
Act were not barred by § 211(a). Id. at 1380.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 1381.
215 Id.
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sion was "not inconsistent" with the Rehabilitation Act. 2 t 6 In making that finding, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the
regulation's categorization of disabled veterans based on "generalized determinations" was inconsistent with section 504's mandate
of "individualized inquiry. ' 2 17 The Court determined that section
504 required no individualized determination of willfulness for veterans disabled by alcoholism. 21 8 According to the Court, the VA's
classification of primary alcoholism as "willful misconduct" was reasonable in light of the conflicting medical evidence regarding the
cause of alcoholism. 2 ' 9 The Court upheld the regulation's classifica220
tion of alcoholism as willful misconduct.
In a scathing dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, rejected the majority's validation of the regulation. 2211 Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for establishing a
rebuttable presumption that primary alcoholism is always the result
of willful misconduct.2 2 2 The Justice emphasized that section 504
"bars the generic treatment of any group of individuals with handicaps based on archaic or simplistic stereotypes about attributes associated with their disabling conditions. "223 According to Justice
Blackmun, the majority "ignore[d] the lesson of Arline, and the clear
dictate of the Rehabilitation Act." ' 224 Citing Arline, Justice Blackmun
stated that section 504 requires an individualized inquiry regarding
each claimant's qualifications, "based on reasoned and medically
sound judgments. ' 2 25 He maintained that the majority had instead
made broad generalizations and supplied its own judgment as to the
causes of alcoholism. 226 Justice Blackmun analogized the School
Board's firing of Arline based on the generalization that all tuberculosis sufferers were contagious and dangerous to the VA's presumption that all primary alcoholics became disabled due to their own
willful misconduct. 227 The Justice emphasized that reliance on even
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1383.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1384.
Traynor, 108 S. Ct. at 1384 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority's position regarding judicial
review.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 1385 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224 Id.
225 Id. (citing School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1129
(1987)).
226 Id. at 1385 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227 Id. at 1388 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216
217
218
219
220
221

942

SETON HALL IA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:916

"reasonable" generalizations was "clearly prohibited under Arline." 2 28 Further, Justice Blackmun noted the sparsity and inaccuracy of the medical evidence relied on by the majority.2 2 9 In
conclusion, the Justice maintained that the plaintiffs' cases should
have been remanded to the VA for "individualized determinations,
based on sound medical judgments" of whether they were "other2 °
wise qualified" to receive an extension of their benefits. '
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in the case of Davis v. Meese2 1 ' analyzed a section 504
claim in a manner similar to the Traynor majority. In Davis, an insulin-dependent diabetic challenged the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) policy of prohibiting all insulin-dependent diabetics
from holding special agent or investigative specialist positions.23 2
At trial, the court heard medical testimony as to the effects and
treatment of diabetes.23 3 Relying on this testimony, the court found
that some diabetics have severe hypoglycemic reactions which could
at least temporarily debilitate them.23 4 The court identified the risk
of a hypoglycemic reaction as the only danger facing a diabetic serving in the specified FBI positions. 23 5 To control the problem, medical experts suggested that an "insulin infusion test" could be used
to detect a susceptibility to hypoglycemia.23 6
While the Davis court effortlessly found diabetics to be "handicapped" within the meaning of the Act, it exhausted considerably
more energy in deciding the "otherwise qualified" issue. 23 7 The
court acknowledged that the Act and Arline mandated an individualized fact-specific inquiry for "otherwise qualified" determinations. 238 Nevertheless, the court upheld the FBI's blanket exclusion
of insulin-dependent diabetics.23 9 Citing Southeastern, the court reasoned that even physical qualifications which exclude an entire class
are valid if they are directly related to "concerns" about safety and
job performance. 2 40 The court suggested that if a test were devised
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

Id.
Id. at 1389 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1391-92 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 506.
Id. at 513-16.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 517-20.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 517.
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which could predict which diabetics presented very little or no risk of
hypoglycemia then a blanket exclusion would be invalid. 24 ' According to the court, even the "small" likelihood that a diabetic would
have a reaction while on the job was enough to justify the generalized exclusion.2 4 2 Moreover, the court rejected plaintiff's suggestion that the FBI should fulfill its "reasonable accommodation"
obligation by placing qualified diabetics on limited duty. 243 Pointing to the financial constraints placed on the FBI by Congress, the
court reasoned that the accommodation of diabetics would impose
an undue hardship on the FBI.2 4 4 Further, the court remarked that
the special agent job required the ability to perform all duties and
assignments .245 The court cited Southeastern in support of the proposition that only a "reasonable" accommodation was required by
the statutes. 2 46 According to the Davis court, no reasonable accommodation was possible.
The Traynor and Davis decisions suggest that the courts still
have not "caught on" to Congressional intent. Once again, the
Supreme Court seemed to be eroding civil rights. However, subsequent decisions by several circuit courts indicate that at least some
courts have heeded Congressional directives. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Martinez v. School Board
of Hillsborough County, Florida2 4 7 properly conducted the individualized inquiry set forth in Arline.2 48 In determining whether a mentally
handicapped AIDS victim was "otherwise qualified" for admission
to public school, the Martinez court considered the "risk" to others
based on medical evidence.2 4 The court concluded that a "remote
theoretical possibility" of transmission was not a sufficient risk to
warrant the child's exclusion from class.2 5 ° Contrary to the Davis
court's holding regarding risk, the Martinez court indicated that only
a significant risk would render the handicapped individual
unqualified. 2 5 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
at 518, 520.
Id. at 520.

241 Id.
242

243 Id. at 519.
244 Id.

245 Id. at 519-20.
246

Id.

247 861 F.2d 1502 (11 th Cir. 1988).
248 Id. at 1505.
249 Id. at 1505-06.
250 Id. at 1506.
251 Id.
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Carter v. Casa Central,25 2 likewise found that only a significant risk to
others could disqualify a handicapped individual.25 3 In Carter, the
handicapped plaintiff was dismissed by her employer who erroneously believed that she posed a risk to others.2 5 4 Detecting no evidence of risk, the Carter court stressed that "[it is precisely this type
of uninformed generalization based upon stereotypes and
prejudices which the Rehabilitation Act is designed to counteract. ' ' 25 5 The court therefore advocated a detailed factual inquiry
into the nature of the disability and the requirements of the job.2 5 6
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted Arline's in-depth factual inquiry.25 7 In Hall v. United
States Postal Service,2 58 the handicapped plaintiff was denied a postal
position based on a job description which required heavy lifting.2 5 9
The Hall court admonished the district court for accepting the job
description as conclusive and for granting summary judgment. 6 °
Quoting extensively from Arline, the court maintained that the
"otherwise qualified" analysis was two-tiered. 26 ' First, the court
must determine whether the physical qualifications are essential to
the job. 6 2 Second, the court must decide whether the handicapped
plaintiff could reasonably be accommodated to perform the job. 26 3
The Hall court emphasized that each tier required a "highly factspecific inquiry" into the actual circumstances and requirements of
the job. 26 4 The purpose of the "individualized inquiry," according
to the court, is "to ensure that the employer's justifications 'reflect a
well-informed judgment grounded in a careful and open-minded
weighing of the risks and alternatives.' "265 While the courts of appeal were once again "on the march towards equal rights for everyone," 26 6 the Supreme Court had reverted back to its earlier practice
of narrowly construing the Act.2 6 7
252 849 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir.
253 Id. at 1054-55.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 1055.
256 See id.
257 See Hall v. United States
258 Id.
259 Id. at 1075.
260 Id. at 1078-79.

1988).

Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1988).

261 See id.
262
263
264
265
266
267

Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1080 (quoting Arline, 772 F.2d at 765).
Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 180, at 7 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
See supra notes 205-236 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

After years of uncertainty and inconsistency in the construction of the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court provided guidance in Arline by setting forth a step-by-step approach to
resolving section 504 claims. Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Restoration Act, which renewed the hope of civil rights
for the handicapped. It bolstered the Rehabilitation Act's antidiscrimination provision to its pre-judicial interpretation status.
Despite the clarity of the Restoration Act, the direction of Arline,
and the unmistakably clear expression of intent by Congress, the
future effectiveness of the statute is once again questionable.
The Supreme Court seems to have forgotten the Arline mandate
and to have ignored Congressional reaffirmations of intent. Yet,
lower federal courts are generally following the Congressionally
paved path.
It appears that Congress still has left too much to judicial
interpretation. While the Southeastern decision remains good law,
the Traynor and Davis cases are examples of how Southeastern can
still be used to circumvent the statutory directives. The "potential risk of harm" consideration adopted by the Court in Southeastern and Arline has already been used improperly by the courts to
side-step section 504 liability. The danger of this element of the
"otherwise qualified" provision is that "potential harm" could almost always be found in any situation. Further amendments to
the Act must explicitly confine the courts to rely on only significant risks proven to exist by medically sound judgments.
The question of reasonable accommodation is also subject
to judicial construction. The "reasonableness" standard leaves
much to interpretation. Congress provided some insight regarding the parameters of the reasonable accommodation requirement when it enacted the Restoration Act's small provider
exception. The exception excuses small providers from making
"significant structural alterations to their existing facilities.

'2 68

While the exception is helpful in establishing the limits of reasonable accommodation for small providers, Congress should have
ventured further. Future amendments to the Act should provide
workable boundaries for reasonableness of accommodation. Perhaps Congress could establish the outer limits of reasonableness
and list a number of factors to be taken into consideration. Addi268 Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 4(2)(C).
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tional guidelines must be furnished in order to prevent judicial
deterioration of the accommodation requirement.
Unless Congress further amends the Act, handicapped individuals will remain subject to the whims of the judiciary. The
Rehabilitation Act may once again become a fascinating tool,
which unfortunately is virtually useless for most purposes.
Lisa M. Boyle

